piper/preface.txt

ENGINEERING A SAFER WORLD.
Systems Thinking Applied to Safety.
By Nancy G Leveson.
The MIT Press.
Cambridge, Massachusetts.
London, England.

We pretend that technology, our technology, is something of a life force, a will, and a thrust
of its own, on which we can blame all, with which we can explain all, and in the end by
means of which we can excuse ourselves.
—T Cuyler Young, Man in Nature.

Series Foreword.

Engineering Systems is an emerging field that is at the intersection of engineering,
management, and the social sciences. Designing complex technological systems
requires not only traditional engineering skills but also knowledge of public policy
issues and awareness of societal norms and preferences. In order to meet the
challenges of rapid technological change and of scaling systems in size, scope, and
complexity, Engineering Systems promotes the development of new approaches,
frameworks, and theories to analyze, design, deploy, and manage these systems.
This new academic field seeks to expand the set of problems addressed by engi-
neers, and draws on work in the following fields as well as others.


one.• Technology and Policy.
two.• Systems Engineering.
three.• System and Decision Analysis, Operations Research.
four.• Engineering Management, Innovation, Entrepreneurship.
five.• Manufacturing, Product Development, Industrial Engineering.

The Engineering Systems Series will reflect the dynamism of this emerging field
and is intended to provide a unique and effective venue for publication of textbooks
and scholarly works that push forward research and education in Engineering
Systems.


Preface.
I began my adventure in system safety after completing graduate studies in com-
puter science and joining the faculty of a computer science department. In the first
week at my new job, I received a phone call from Marion Moon, a system safety
engineer at what was then the Ground Systems Division of Hughes Aircraft
Company. Apparently he had been passed between several faculty members, and I
was his last hope. He told me about a new problem they were struggling with on a
torpedo project, something he called. “software safety.” I told him I didn ot know
anything about it and that I worked in a completely unrelated field. I added that I
was willing to look into the problem. That began what has been a thirty-year search
for a solution and to the more general question of how to build safer systems.
Around the year 2000, I became very discouraged. Although many bright people
had been working on the problem of safety for a long time, progress seemed to be
stalled. Engineers were diligently performing safety analyses that did not seem to
have much impact on accidents. The reason for the lack of progress, I decided, was
that the technical foundations and assumptions on which traditional safety engineer-
ing efforts are based are inadequate for the complex systems we are building today.
The world of engineering has experienced a technological revolution, while the
basic engineering techniques applied in safety and reliability engineering, such as
fault tree analysis (FTA) and failure modes and effects analysis (FMEA), have
changed very little. Few systems are built without digital components, which operate
very differently than the purely analog systems they replace. At the same time, the
complexity of our systems and the world in which they operate has also increased
enormously. The old safety engineering techniques, which were based on a much
simpler, analog world, are diminishing in their effectiveness as the cause of
accidents changes.
For twenty years I watched engineers in industry struggling to apply the old
techniques to new software-intensive systems — expending much energy and having
little success. At the same time, engineers can no longer focus only on technical
issues and ignore the social, managerial, and even political factors that impact safety
if we are to significantly reduce losses. I decided to search for something new. This
book describes the results of that search and the new model of accident causation
and system safety techniques that resulted.
The solution, I believe, lies in creating approaches to safety based on modern
systems thinking and systems theory. While these approaches may seem new or
paradigm changing, they are rooted in system engineering ideas developed after
World War 2. They also build on the unique approach to engineering for safety,
called System Safety, that was pioneered in the 1950s by aerospace engineers such
as C O Miller, Jerome Lederer, and Willie Hammer, among others. This systems
approach to safety was created originally to cope with the increased level of com-
plexity in aerospace systems, particularly military aircraft and ballistic missile
systems. Many of these ideas have been lost over the years or have been displaced
by the influence of more mainstream engineering practices, particularly reliability
engineering.
This book returns to these early ideas and updates them for todays technology.
It also builds on the pioneering work in Europe of Jens Rasmussen and his followers
in applying systems thinking to safety and human factors engineering.
Our experience to date is that the new approach described in this book is more
effective, less expensive, and easier to use than current techniques. I hope you find
it useful.

Relationship to Safeware.
My first book, Safeware, presents a broad overview of what is known and practiced
in System Safety today and provides a reference for understanding the state of the
art. To avoid redundancy, information about basic concepts in safety engineering
that appear in Safeware is not, in general, repeated. To make this book coherent
in itself, however, there is some repetition, particularly on topics for which my
understanding has advanced since writing Safeware.

Audience.
This book is written for the sophisticated practitioner rather than the academic
researcher or the general public. Therefore, although references are provided, an
attempt is not made to cite or describe everything ever written on the topics or to
provide a scholarly analysis of the state of research in this area. The goal is to provide
engineers and others concerned about safety with some tools they can use when
attempting to reduce accidents and make systems and sophisticated products safer.
It is also written for those who are not safety engineers and those who are
not even engineers. The approach described can be applied to any complex,
sociotechnical system such as health care and even finance. This book shows you
how to “reengineer” your system to improve safety and better manage risk. If pre-
venting potential losses in your field is important, then the answer to your problems
may lie in this book.

Contents.
The basic premise underlying this new approach to safety is that traditional models
of causality need to be extended to handle todays engineered systems. The most
common accident causality models assume that accidents are caused by component
failure and that making system components highly reliable or planning for their
failure will prevent accidents. While this assumption is true in the relatively simple
electromechanical systems of the past, it is no longer true for the types of complex
sociotechnical systems we are building today. A new, extended model of accident
causation is needed to underlie more effective engineering approaches to improving
safety and better managing risk.
The book is divided into three sections. The first part explains why a new approach
is needed, including the limitations of traditional accident models, the goals for a
new model, and the fundamental ideas in system theory upon which the new model
is based. The second part presents the new, extended causality model. The final part
shows how the new model can be used to create new techniques for system safety
engineering, including accident investigation and analysis, hazard analysis, design
for safety, operations, and management.
This book has been a long time in preparation because I wanted to try the new
techniques myself on real systems to make sure they work and are effective. In
order not to delay publication further, I will create exercises, more examples, and
other teaching and learning aids and provide them for download from a website in
the future.

Chapters 6 – 10, on system safety engineering and hazard analysis, are purposely
written to be stand-alone and therefore usable in undergraduate and graduate
system engineering classes where safety is just one part of the class contents and
the practical design aspects of safety are the most relevant.

Acknowledgments.

The research that resulted in this book was partially supported by numerous research
grants over many years from NSF and NASA. David Eckhardt at the NASA Langley
Research Center provided the early funding that got this work started.
I also am indebted to all my students and colleagues who have helped develop
these ideas over the years. There are too many to list, but I have tried to give them
credit throughout the book for the ideas they came up with or we worked on
together. I apologize in advance if I have inadvertently not given credit where it is
due. My students, colleagues, and I engage in frequent discussions and sharing of
ideas, and it is sometimes difficult to determine where the ideas originated. Usually
the creation involves a process where we each build on what the other has done.
Determining who is responsible for what becomes impossible. Needless to say, they
provided invaluable input and contributed greatly to my thinking.
I am particularly indebted to the students who were at MIT while I was writing
this book and played an important role in developing the ideas: Nicolas Dulac,
Margaret Stringfellow, Brandon Owens, Matthieu Couturier, and John Thomas.
Several of them assisted with the examples used in this book.
Other former students who provided important input to the ideas in this book
are Matt Jaffe, Elwin Ong, Natasha Neogi, Karen Marais, Kathryn Weiss, David
Zipkin, Stephen Friedenthal, Michael Moore, Mirna Daouk, John Stealey, Stephanie
Chiesi, Brian Wong, Mal Atherton, Shuichiro Daniel Ota, and Polly Allen.
Colleagues who provided assistance and input include Sidney Dekker, John
Carroll, Joel Cutcher-Gershenfeld, Joseph Sussman, Betty Barrett, Ed Bachelder,
Margaret-Anne Storey, Meghan Dierks, and Stan Finkelstein.