43 lines
3.0 KiB
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43 lines
3.0 KiB
Plaintext
Epilogue.
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In the simpler world of the past, classic safety engineering techniques that focus on
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preventing failures and chains of failure events were adequate. They no longer
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suffice for the types of systems we want to build, which are stretching the limits of
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complexity human minds and our current tools can handle. Society is also expecting
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more protection from those responsible for potentially dangerous systems.
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Systems theory provides the foundation necessary to build the tools required
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to stretch our human limits on dealing with complexity. STAMP translates basic
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system theory ideas into the realm of safety and thus provides a foundation for
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our future.
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As demonstrated in the previous chapter, some industries have been very suc-
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cessful in preventing accidents. The U.S. nuclear submarine program is not the only
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one. Others seem to believe that accidents are the price of progress or of profits,
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and they have been less successful. What seems to distinguish those experiencing
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success is that they:
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1.• Take a systems approach to safety in both development and operations
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2.•Have instituted a learning culture where they have effective learning from
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events
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3.•Have established safety as a priority and understand that their long-term
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success depends on it
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This book suggests a new approach to engineering for safety that changes the focus
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from “prevent failures” to “enforce behavioral safety constraints,” from reliability
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to control. The approach is constructed on an extended model of accident causation
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that includes more than the traditional models, adding those factors that are increas-
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ingly causing accidents today. It allows us to deal with much more complex systems.
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What is surprising is that the techniques and tools described in part III that are built
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on STAMP and have been applied in practice on extremely complex systems have
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been easier to use and much more effective than the old ones.
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Others will improve these first tools and techniques. What is critical is the overall
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philosophy of safety as a function of control. This philosophy is not new: It stems
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from the prescient engineers who created System Safety after World War II in the
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military aviation and ballistic missile defense systems. What they lacked, and what
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we have been hindered in our progress by not having, is a more powerful accident
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causality model that matches today’s new technology and social drivers. STAMP
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provides that. Upon this foundation and using systems theory, new more powerful
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hazard analysis, design, specification, system engineering, accident/incident analysis,
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operations, and management techniques can be developed to engineer a safer world.
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Mueller in 1968 described System Safety as “organized common sense” [109]. I
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hope that you have found that to be an accurate description of the contents of this
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book. In closing I remind you of the admonition by Bertrand Russell: “A life without
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adventure is likely to be unsatisfying, but a life in which adventure is allowed to
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take any form it will is sure to be short” [179, p. 21]. |